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ABSTRACT
In nuisance—type cases, legal commentators generally recommend —
andthe courts seem to increasingly use —theaward of damages rather than
the granting of an injunction of the harmed party. Thisessay compares
the economic consequences of injunctive and damage remedies under a variety
of circumstances. The discussion focuses on the ability of the remedies
to deal with the strategic behavior of the ],tigants, the cost of redistri—
butlng income among the litigants (or classes of litigants), and the im-
perfect information of the courts. In ideal circumstances —cooperative
behavior, costless redistribution, and perfect information —injunctive
and damage remedies are equivalent. The presence of strategic behavior
alone does not change this conclusion. However, if it is also costly to
redistribute income, the remedies are no longer equivalent. When there
are a small number of 1,itigants in these circumstances, neither remedy is
generally more effective. When there are a large number of litigants, the
damage remedy is superior. Finally, and most realistically, if the courts
also have imperfect information, neither remedy dominates the other. Thus,
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This essay compares the use of two private remedies——injunctions and
damages—to resolve what will be referred to as a "nuisance dispute."!' By
a nuisance dispute I mean any situation in which some injurer (or group of
injurers) harms some victim (or group of victims) in a continuing, non—
accidental way.! Nearly all instances of pollution fit this description,
as do many other types of land use conflict. Some specific examples are
emissions from a factory falling upon a neighboring property, bright lights or
noise disturbing a person's sleep, or an unsightly building constructed in an
attractive residential neighborhood.
Because of litigation and other administrative costs, the use of private
remedies to resolve nuisance disputes makes most sense when there are very few
parties involved, or when a large number of parties can be represented cheaply
and effectively by a single individual...! Accordingly, the focus of this
essay is on the so—called "small number" case described by these conditions.
However, the "large number" case also will be discussed.
The problem of resolving nuisance disputes may, following Calabresi and
Melamed,Y be usefully thought of as involving two steps. An initial determina-
tionmust be made regarding who is entitled to prevail in the dispute. Should
the polluter be given the right to pollute, or the pollutees the right to be
freefrom pollution? Then, in the language of Calabresi and Melamed, a decision
must be made whether to protect the entitlement by a "property rule" or a
"liability rule." The former grants the holder of the entitlement an injunction
while the latter awards him damages, determined by some collective authority
such as a court. Thus, they explain, there are four possibilities, depending
on who is given the entitlement and how it is protected.—3—
Most recent legal commentaries on nuisance law have strongly recommended
the use of damage remedies—-liability rules——rather than injunctive remedies——
property rules./ Whether court decisions also favor damage remedies is
unclear, although many commentators believe there is a trend in thisdirection.fi
Essentially three reasons have been suggested for this preference. These
willbe referred to as the extortion, strategic behavior, and "bonus payment
arguments .1/
Thefirst argument against injunctive remedies is that theysupposedly
allow the plaintiff to "extort" the defendant. This possibility arises whenever
the potential cost imposed on the defendant by enforcement of the injunction
exceeds the plaintiff's damages. For example, a pollutee may suffer $1,000
damages while the lost profits to the polluter if his plant is shut down by
the injunction may be $10,000. Because the defendant may be willing to pay up
to his potential cost to prevent enforcement, the plaintiff can obtain com-
pensation (possibly far) in excess of his actual damages. Since under a damage
remedy damages are set by the court——presumably at $1,000 in this example——
there is apparently no scope for extortion. This argument for damage remedi
is distributionally oriented since successful extortion is consistent with the
efficient resolution of the conflict. In other words, the plaintiff's ability
to obtain a large share of the joint benefits from the efficient resolution of
the dispute does not imply that the dispute will not be resolved efficiently.
The strategic behavior argument for damage remedies concerns the efficiency
consequences of unsuccessful extortion. The efficient result may require not
enforcing the injunction, but when extortion is possible, the plaintiff may
hold out for more than the defendant is willing to pay. In other words,
strategic behavior may lead to enforcement of the injunction when enforcement
would not be efficient. In the previous example, the plaintiff may hold out—4—
for $8,000 while the defendant may refuse to pay anything over $5,000. As a
result, the plaintiff may enforce the injunction and have the defendant's
plant shut down (at least for some period). In contrast, it is argued that
the award of damages would overcome strategic behavior problems because the
defendant would be induced to decide unilaterally how to behave. In the example,
any damage award under $10,000 presumably would lead the defendant to choose
to keep his plant in operation.
The third argument for damage remedies is usually treated as subsidiary
to the other two. Once it has been decided to use a damage remedy for either
of the other reasons, it is possible to pursue additional distributional goals
by increasing ("bonus payments') or reducing the monetary payment relative
to actual damages. In the example, suppose the plaintiff is poorer than the
defendant and a more equal distribution of income is desired. The damage
award apparently can be finely tuned to achieve the precise amount of redis-
tribution preferred. This may be beneficial since redistribution by other
means——such as the income tax system——may be costlier (in an efficiency sense).
In contrast, distributional outcomes under the injunctive remedy are indeterminate
because of extortion and strategic behavior possibilities. For example, extor-
tion may lead the defendant to pay the plaintiff any amount between $1,000 and
$10,000; or, if the injunction is enforced, extortion may lead to the defendant
shutting down, losing $10,000, and to the plaintiff suffering no damages.
The three arguments, taken together, amount to the proposition that damage
remedies are better able to achieve the efficient outcome (the strategic behavior
argument) and to promote collectively desired distributional results (the
extortion and bonus payment arguinents)../ The pursuit of these goals——efficiency
and distributional equity—will be the standard by which injunctive and damage
remedies will be evaluated in this essay .2.!—5—
However, it will be shown that in realistic circumstances the preference
for damage remedies is not generally supportable. In terms of efficiency,
this is because damage remedies are just as susceptible to strategic behavior
problems as injunctive remedies when, realistically, damages are not correctly
estimated by the court. And in terms of distributional equity, this is because
damage remedies are not nearly as flexible distributionally as Is usually
presumed. Damage remedies still may be preferable in some circumstances, but
injunctive remedies may be superior in other circumstances. By systematically
exploring the relative merits of the remedies in different situations, I hope
to provide a better understanding of when each should be used.
The essay is organized as follows. In Section II the two goals of effi-
ciency and distributional equity are discussed in more detail. In Section III,
the "instruments" for achieving these goals——entitlements and the remedies for
their protection——are also discussed in more detail. Then, in Sections IV
through VIII, the remedies are analyzed under different assumptions about the
bargaining behavior of the litigants, the cost of redistributing income among
the litigants (or classes of litigants) by means other than the remedies, and
the information available to the court. In each of these sections it is assumed
that there is one injurer and one victim. Section IV begins with the best of
all possible worlds——the parties bargain cooperatively, income can be -redis-
tributed costlessly among the litigants, and the courts have perfect information.
Sections V through VIII then add complications, one at a time, In the following
order: the strategic behavior of the litigants, the cost of redistributing
income among the litigants, and the Imperfect Information of the courts (of
two varieties). In Section IX the remedies are discussed when there is one
injurer and many victims. Finally, Section X reexamines the three arguments—6—
for damage remedies discussed in the introduction. (It may be helpful to
read Section X before the others.)
The basic conclusions of this essay can be briefly stated as follows. In
the best of all possible worlds——cooperative behavior, costless redistribution,
and perfect information——injunctive and damage remedies are equally desirable.
The presence of strategic behavior alone does not change this conclusion.
However, if it is also costly to redistribute income, the remedies are no
longer equivalent. When there are a small number of litigants in these
circumstances, neither remedy is generally preferable. When there are a large
number of litigants, the damage remedy is superior. Finally, and most realis-
tically, if the courts also have imperfect information, neither remedy Is
generally preferable. Depending on what information is available, the injuctive
or the damage remedy may be more desirable. Thus, the general presumption
in favor of damage remedies Is not supported.—7—
II. THE COALS: EFFICIENCY AND DISTRIBUTIONAL EQUITY
The arguments against injunctive remedies discussed in the introduction
were based on the desirability of attaining two goals——one relating to the
efficient allocation of resources, the other relating to the desired distri-
bution of income among individuals. Before examining in detail how injunctive
and damage remedies can be used to pursue efficiency and distributional equity,
it will be useful to examine these goals more precisely.
The efficient resolution of the dispute mightinvolve the parties co-
existing, but adjusting their behavior. For example, in many pollution
conflicts the efficient resolution is for the pollutees to remain at their
present locations, and for the polluter to reduce——but not eliminate——his
pollution. This is, in fact, the "textbook case" in most discussions by
economists of externality problems i2i
Alternatively,the efficient solution might involve one of the parties
shutting down or moving away. For example, the efficient solution might
require that the polluter remain and the pollutees relocate, or viceversaiJ]
For the purposes of this essay, it will be assumed that the efficient
solution is of the first type——the parties coexist bu.t one shouldaccommodate.i
Specifically, the discussion will be in terms of a polluting factory next to
a group of residents, who for now will be assumed to be represented by a
single party (sometimes referred to as "theresident")Ji To further simplify
the situation, it will be assumed that each unit of the factory's output
causes the same amount of damage (and that the residents cannot affect the
level of damages by their behavior). These assumptions are unrealistic in
many respects, but the basic points to be developed will apply aswell to
more complicated situations. It is also assumed that at low levels of the—8—
factory's output each unit of output increases the factory's profits more
than it increases the residents' damages and that at high levels of the
factory's output, the reverse is true. The efficient solution Is to have
the factory pollute as long as the factory's extra profit from the last unit
of production (the marginal profit) exceeds the residents' Increase in damages
from that unit of production (the marginal damage); any smaller output
would involve losses to the factory greater than the gains to the residents,
and any greater output would impose losses on the residents greater than
the gains to the factory.!i
A simple numerical example, which will be used throughout this essay,
may serve to illustrate the nuisance dispute. The basic data are provided
In Table 1. If the factory produces nothing, It earns nothing and causes no
damage.!￿J Thus, the joint profits of the parties——total profits less
total damages——are also zero. The first unit of output by the factory results
in $17,000 profits to itself and causes $7,000 damage to the residents.
Thus, joint profits are $10,000 (=$17,000—$7,000).The change in joint
profits from the previous level of output is also $10,000 ($10,000—$0).
This change will be referred to as the marginal "gains from trade" (the
motivation for this terminology will become c1ear—!i). The second unit of out-
put leads to an additional $13,000 profits to the factory and an additional
$7,000 damages to the residents, resulting in total profits to the factory
of $30,000 and total daniages to the residents of $14,000. At this level of
output, he joint profits of the parties are $16,000 ($30,000—$14,000)
and the marginal gains from trade are $6,000 (=$16,000—$10,000).The results
for the remaining output are interpeted similarly. Note that eventually——at
the sixth unit of output——the factory actually loses money by producing more
(for example, because its marginal production costs are rising steeply).—9—
TABLE 1
Total
Marginal Marginal Total Total Profits Marginal
Output Profits Damages Profits Damages less "Gains"
of of of of of Total from
Factory Factory ResidentsFactory ResidentsDamages Trade"
O —— —— $0 $0 $0 ——
1 $17,000 $7,000 $17,000 $7,000 $10,000 $10,000
2 13,000 7,000 30,000 14,000 16,000 6,000
3 9,000 7,000 39,000 21,000 18,000 2,000
4 5,000 7,000 44,000 28,000 16,000 —2,000
5 1,000 7,000 45,000 35,000 10,000 —6,000
6 —3,000 7,000 42,000 42,000 0 —10,000
7 —7,000 7,000 35,000 49,000 —14,000 —14,000—10—
In the numerical example the joint profits of the parties are maximized
at $18,000 when the factory produces three units of output. This output
willbe referred to as the "efficient" output.2L/ A useful way of viewing
thejoint profit maximizing or efficient outputis in terms of the marginal
gainsfrom trade. At every output except the third unit, there are marginal
gains from trade, i.e., joint profits can be increased by changing the level
of output. If output is less than three units, joint profits can be increased
by increasing output, while if output is greater than three units, joint
profits can be increased by reducing output. Only at an output of three
units will any change result in smaller joint profits. For this reason, it
will be said that at the efficient or joint profit maximizing output, all of
the gains from trade have been "exploited."
The second potentially important component of any nuisance dispute
involves distributional considerations.' For example, even if the efficient
solution were achieved, it must still be decided who is to bear the remaining
damages and who is to reap the gains from trade of getting to the efficient
solution. In the numerical example, at the efficient output the residents
suffer $21,000 in damages and the total gains from trade are, starting from
zero output, $18,000. It is not necessary for purposes of this essay to
discuss how these distributional choices should be made. The question
answered here is a simpler one: how do injunctive and damage remedies compare
in their ability to achieve distributional goals, regardless of the specifics
of those goals?
Although two of the three traditional arguments used to evaluate nuisance
remedies were based on distributional considerations (the extortion and bonus
payment arguments), it might be argued that such considerations should not
affect the choice of the remedy since distributional goals can be better handled—11—
by other means, like the income tax system. While it is undoubtedly true that
broad distributional goals can be better promoted through the tax system, this
does not imply that distributional considerations should be totally ignored in
the choice of nuisance remedies. First of all, many versions of both injunctive
and damage remedies may be able to reach the efficient outcome (e.g., In the
case of the damage remedy, there may be many liability schedules which are
efficieniJ2i). Since redistribution through the tax system (or by other means)
is.costly,1 It makes sense to use the distributional goal to break efficiency
ties. Secondly, even when the efficiency goal points toward one remedy, It
may be desirable to allow distributional considerations to have some weight.
Again, this is because redistribution by means other than the remedies is
costly. To see the relevance of the distributional goal, consider the
following extreme example. Suppose the distributional goal strongly favors
redistribution to the poor and that the degree of progessivity of the income
tax necessary to achieve this would lead individuals to work and earn very
little. In other words, redistribution through the tax system may not be
very effective and may cause substantial distortions in work effort. On the
other hand, suppose most poor persons live near polluting factories and that
these factories are owned primarily by much richer persons. Then the remedy
chosen to resolve the nuisance dispute may also be a useful instrument for
improving the distribution of Income. Even if there is a remedy which is
efficient, it may be desirable to choose an inefficient alternative if it can
achieve the desired redistribution without too much sacrifice in efficiency..±i
Obviously, the ability to redistribute through the choice of nuisance
remedies depends on how closely the plaintiffs and defendants in typical
nuisance disputes correspond to the groups between which redistribution Is
desired. In practice, I would expect there to be some correspondence between—12—
these categories (for example, nuisance plaintiffs probably are poorer than
nuisance defendants), but often not a very large one. For this reason, the
reader should keep in mind the possibly limited role for the remedies with
respect to redistribution. However, because the distributional goal is
central to at least one of the traditional arguments for damage remedies
(the bonus payment argument) and because there are undoubtedly many nuisance
disputes where it does play an important role in addition to the efficiency
goal, it's relevance to the choice of nuisance remedies is seriously considered
in this essay.
It will often be convenient to subsume the goals of efficiency and distri-
butional equity within a more general concept of "social welfare". Social wel-
fare can he thought of as a weighted average of the two underlying goals, with
the weights assigned according to their relative importance. Social welfare
thus provides a single measure for comparing injunctive and damage remedies.—13—
III. THE INSTRUMENTS: ENTITLEMENTS AND
REMEDIES FOR THEIR PROTECTION
Entitlements are sometimes thought of as absolute:either the residents
are entitled to be free of all pollution, orthe factory is entitled to pollute
any amount desired (presumably theamount which would maximize itsprofits).i
If entitlements are absolute, there is no ambiguityabout the distinction
between injunctive and damage remedies. If theentitlement is given to the
residents, then the only question is whether the factorymust buy their
permission to pollute——an injunctive remedy——ormust pay court—determined
damages. Similarly, if the entitlement goes tothe factory, then the only
question is whether the residents must"bribe" the factory to reduce pollution
an injunctive remedy——or must pay the company"damages" (presumably reduced
profits), again determined by a collective authoritylike a court. This
last possibility is unconventional, although it hasbeen used.i It will
be referred to here as a reverse damage remedy or liabilityrule.?i
There is no logical reason, however, to view entitlements asabsolute.
They might also be intermediate. For example,the factory might be entitiid
to pollute up to some point and the residentswould be entitled to be free
of pollution beyond this point.! Any level of thefactory's output could
serve as the basis for defining an intermediateentitlement.
Once entitlements are treated as intermediate, thereis a certain
ambiguity in the use of injunctive and damageremedies. Unlike the situation
when entitlements are absolute, there are two directionsin which output
might be changed. Given an intermediate entitlement,the factory might want
to increase its output, or the residents might wantto decrease the factory's
output. The types of remedies governingthese two changes could be the
same, but they do not have to be.—14-t
Whenintermediate entitlements are discussed In this essay,the injunctive
and damage remedies will be defined in the followingmanner. Under an injunc-
tive remedy, each party can enjoin deviationsfrom the entitlement point.
Under the normal version of the damage remedy,the factory can increase Its
output beyond the entitlement pointif It pays the residents the court
determined damages; If the residents want the factory's outputlowered they
would be required to "bribe" the factory.Under the "reverse" damage remedy,
the residents could reduce the factory's output upon paymentto the factory
of "damages"; if the factory wants to increase outputit would be required to
bribe the residents. These definitions of injunctiveand damage remedies are
theones generally used by legalccinmentators.ZJ—15—
IV. THE BEST OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS
Imagine a world, admittedly unrealistic, in which parties to a nuisance
dispute bargain cooperatively (in the sense that they exploit all gains from
trade), income can be redistributed costlessly, and courts have perfect
information.L'Itwill be useful to analyze injunctive and damage remedie
in this idealized setting before examining them in more realistic contexts.
In the present setting injunctive remedies are efficient regardless of
the entitlement point chosen. Consider, for example, an absolute entitlement
given to the resident—victim. Starting from zero output, the factory would
gain $17,000 in profits if it could produce one unit. Since the victim
would only suffer $7,000 in damages, they could strike a deal in which the
factory pays the resident at least $7,000 and no more than $17,000 in order
to produce one unit. Assuming cooperative behavior, such a deal would be
struck. How much is actually paid by the factory to the resident is inde-
terminate without further assumptions and might be said to depend on the
relative bargaining strengths of the two parties. As long as the factory's
marginal profits exceed the resident's marginal damages, similar deals can
and will be made. Thus, the parties will bargain to three units, the
efficient output.
The same reasoning applies to any other entitlement point, whether an
absolute one to the factory, or an intermediate one. If the entitlement
is an intermediate one, there are potentially two directions in which the
parties can bargain. However, it is always the case that deals can be struck
only in one direction——toward the efficient outcome. For example, consider
an entitlement point corresponding to four units of output. An increase in
output by one unit will increase the factory's profits by $1,000, but will
increase the resident's damages by $7,000. There is no way the factory can—16—
buy off the resident. However, a reduction in output by one unit willreduce
the factory's profits by $5,000 and the resident's damages by $7,000. Thus,
the resident would pay the factory something between $5,000 and $7,000 to
reduce output by one unit to the efficient output of three units. Once the
parties are at the efficient output, no deals can be made in eitherdirection.
When an injunctive remedy is used, the distribution of income between
the parties will, of course, be affected by the choice of the entitlement
point. Everything else equal, the closer an intermediateentitlement comes
to being an absolute entitlement to one of the parties, the better off that
party is and the worse off the other party is. However,the distributional
effects of any given entitlement are indeterminate. The source of this
indeterminacy is that there are many possible mutually beneficial agreements
that will mov the parties from the entitlement point towards the efficient
solution to the dispute; each agreement involves a different division of the
gains from trade between the parties. Each party will obtain some portion
of the gains from trade, but this fraction may range from close to zero to
close to one, depending on the relative bargaining strengths of the parties.
Thus, one of the key features of injunctive remedies is their distributional
indeterminateness.
Since it is assumed that redistribution by means other than the remedies
is costless, the distributional indeterminacy of the injunctive remedy is not
of any consequence. No matter what distributional outcome results from the
bargaining process, it can be modified in any way desired by lump—sum
transfers. For example, suppose an absolute entitlement to the victim is
used and that the parties are equally good bargainers in the sense that they
split the gains from trade in half. Thus, the factory would pay the resident
$12,000 in order to produce the first unit ($7,000 for damages plus $5,000—17—
for half of the gains from trade), leaving the factory with marginal profits
of $5,000 (=$17,000—$12,000).Similarly, the factory would pay $10,000
and $8,000 for the second and third units, leaving it with marginal profits
of $3,000 and $1,000 for those units. The factory's total profits would
therefore be $9,000 ($5,000+ $3,000 +$1,000),and the resident would be
compensated $9,000 in excess of actual damages. This result simply reflects
the fact that the total gains from trade, starting at zero output, are $18,000,
and that these gains are split in half. Suppose, however, that social welfare
is maximized when two—thirds of the gains from trade go to the victim. In
other words, the ideal distribution of income is for the resident to have
$12,000 and for the factory to get $6,000. A $3,000 lump—sum tax on the
factory transferred to the resident will achieve this, given the actual
bargaining outcome. Obviously, the same result can be achieved no matter
what the relative bargaining strengths of the parties are.
In the present setting, damage remedies will also be efficient regard-
less of the entitlement point chosen. Consider again an absolute entitlement
to the resident—victim. Suppose also that the factory is liable to the
resident for actual damages suffered——$7,000 per unit of output. Starting
from zero output, the factory would gain $17,000 in profits before damage
payments if it produced one unit of output. Clearly it will choose to do
so. Moreover, there is no incentive for the resident to attempt to pay the
factory not to increase output since he is fully compensated. Similarly,
the factory will choose to produce the second and third units, and the resi-
dent will not find it worthwhile to try to stop this. Since liability
exceeds marginal profits beyond the third unit, the factory will remain at
that output, the efficient one.—18—
The same reasoning applies to any other entitlement. For example,
consider the intermediate entitlement corresponding to foUr units of output.
In this case the damage remedy would take the "reverse" form——the resident
would have the right to choose the factory's output upon payment to the
factory of its "damages" (reduced profits) from the entitlement potht.
Thus, the resident would clearly choose to have the factory decrease output
from four to three units since the resident's damages are reduced by $7,000,
but the factory only has to be compensated $5,000. The residentwould have
no further incentive to decrease the factory's output since the factory's
reduction in profits would exceed the resident's reduction in damages.
Again, the efficient output is arrived at.
Thus far, the damage remedy has been analyzed on the assumption that
the schedule of liability corresponds to the actual damages suffered. However,
assuming cooperative behavior, any schedule of liability would also lead to
the efficient solution. Take, for example, an absolute entitlement to the
victim with liability of $4,000 per unit of output. Since the factory's
marginal profits exceed $4,000 for the first four units of output, the factory
will initially produce four units, "overshooting" the efficient output.
However, the resident then has an incentive to strike a deal with the factory
to reduce output one unit. This is because the resident will he $3,000
better off (the $7,000 savings in damages offset by a $4,000 liability payment
not received), while the factory will only he $1,000 worse off (a $5,000
reduction in profits offset by not having to make a $4,000 liability payment).
Thus, the resident would pay the factory something between $1,000 and $3,000
to reduce output by one unit to the efficient output of three units. Once
at this output, there are no further bargains which can be struck.—19—
When a damage remedy is used, the distribution of income between the
parties is clearly affected by the choice of the entitlement point.
Everything else equal, each party is best off by having the entitlement
point as close to an absolute entitlement to him as possible. The main
difference from the injunctive remedy is that the distribution of income
can be, depending on the schedule of liability used, completely determinate
and independent of the relative bargaining strengths of the parties. This
was illustrated, for example, in the case of an absolute entitlement to the
victim with liability equal to actual damages. The victim was compensated
for his actual damages and the factory obtained all of the gains from trade.
There was no scope for bargaining since at no ouput could the resident
bribe the factory not to increase output.
However, the distributional outcome under the damage remedy is not
always determinate and independent of the parties' bargaining strengths.
This was seen in the case of an absolute entitlement to the victim with
liability of $4,000 per unit of output. In this case it was shown that the
factory would initially "overshoot" the efficient output and the resident
would offer between $1,000 and $3,000 to have the factory produce at the
efficient output. The actual settlement depends on the relative bargaining
strengths of the parties.
Again, since it is assumed that income can be redistributed costlessly
by lump—sum transfers, the distributional outcome of the damage remedy——
whether determinate or not——is of no consequence. While it may be possible
to structure the damage remedy so that it can simultaneously reach the effi-
cient outcome and the distributionally equitable outcome, if this is not
possible, the remedy should be designed only to reach the efficient outcome—20—
(e.g., by making liability equal to actual damages). The distributional
goal can be handled separately by lump—sum transfers.
Thus, in the best of all possible worlds, either an injunctive remedy or
a damage remedy can be used to achieve the social welfare maximum. In each
case, the cooperative behavior of the parties guarantees that the remedy will
be efficient and the availability of costless redistritution assures that
distributional equity will not be sacrificed by the pursuit of efficiency.
The fact that the court has perfect information is irrelevant.—21—
V. STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
Parties to a dispute can hardly becounted on to always act in a cooper-
ative manner. The fact that unionsstrike and nations go to war suggests
that an assumption of cooperative behaviorwould be unrealistic in a
nonlegal setting. And the fact that partiesfrequently go to court rather
than settle more cheaply out of court suggeststhat this assumption is often
unrealistic in a legal setting.i For these reasons,it will now be
assumed that the parties to the nuisance disputebehave strategically in the
sense that they do not exploitall of the gains from trade. This kind of
behavior might result from the desire ofeach party to hold out for a large
share of the gains from trade. If both partiesare "stubborn"——becaUSe each
wants to establish himself as a toughbargainer——then they may fail to reach
an agreement.2i It will stillbe assumed for now that income can be costlessly
redistributed between the parties and thatthe courts have perfect information.
In the present setting injunctive remedies areno longer efficient
regardless of the entitlement pointchosen. Consider, for example, an absolute
entitlement to the resident. Althoughthe factory would gain $17,000 from
producing the first unit of outputand the resident would suffer only $7,000
in damages, the resident might hold outfor an unacceptably large "bribe"
from the factory. If this happens,the injunction would be fully enforced
and the factory would be driven,inefficiently, out of business. Even if
the parties agree on how to split the gainsfrom trade of $10,000 (=$17,000
—$7,000),the bargaining problem arises again overthe next unit of output.
Assuming strategic behavior, the parties may agreeto move somewhat towards
the efficient output, but they will not getthere. This problem arises
whenever the entitlement point differsfrom the efficient output since there
are then potential gains fromtrade over which the parties must bargain.—22—
This discussion suggests a simple way to overcome the inefficiency of
strategic behavior under the injunctive remedy——start with an entitlement
point which coincides with the efficient output. This works because there
are no remaining gains from trade over which the parties can possibly bargain
and therefore no scope for strategic behavior. Thus, the parties will stay
at the efficient output.
In general, the distribution of income under the Injunctive remedy is
indeterminate because it depends on the parties' relative barganing strengths
and on the extent of the bargaining failure due to strategic behavior.
However, if the entitlement point is the efficient output, the distribution
of income is completely determined since there are no gains from trade over
which the parties bargain and therefore no scope for bargaining failure. In
the numerical example, the total profits of the factory at the efficient out-
put of three units would be $37,000 and the total damages of the resident would
be $21,000. Although there is no reason in general why the particular distri-
bution of income which results from choosing the efficient output as the
entitlement point is the most equitable one, this distribution can be modified
in any way desired since it is still assumed that costless redistribution is
possible. Thus, despite strategic behavior, the injunctive remedy can be
used to achieve the efficient and the distributionally equitable outcome.
In the present setting the damage remedy is no longer efficient regardless
of the liability schedule. In particular, if liability ever exceeds actual
damages, a situation is created in which the parties have an Incentive to
bargain over (at least some of) the gains from trade. For example, suppose
there is an absolute entitlement to the resident and that the liability
schedule is constant at $9,000. In considering whether to produce one unit
of output the factory will realize that while it will gain $8,000 (=$17,000—23—
—$9,000),the resident will also gain $2,000 ($9,000—$7,000,i.e.,
liabilitypayments less actual damages). By not producing the first unit of
output, the factory can deny this gain to the resident. If the factory
believesthat it is a better bargainer than the resident, it may threaten to
deny this gain unless the resident pays some specified amount up to his full
gain of $2,000. If the resident believes that he is the better bargainer,
he may not give in to this demand. As a result, the factory may end up
carrying out its threat in order to make future threats credible. Even if
the parties get past this first hurdle, the same problem arises with respect
to the second unit of output. Assuming strategic behavior, the parties'
bargaining will break down at some output short of the efficient output.
The kind of "extortion" just described cannot occur under the damage
remedy if liability is equal to actual damages. To see this, suppose that
the factory is liable for the $7,000 actual damages imposed on the resident
starting at the entitlement of zero output. Since the resident is not over—
compensated, there is no incentive for the factory to threaten to not produ:
the first unit of output. Moreover, it is not possible for the resident
bribe the factory not to produce the first unit of output. The factory
would have to be paid its after—liability marginal profits of $10,000
(=$17,000—$7,000),but the resident would not be willing to offer anything
since, with full compensation, he is indifferent whether the first unit is
produced or not. The resident is also indifferent with respect to every
other level of output. Thus, the factory will maximize its after—liability
profits by producing at the efficient output of three units.
It is also the case that extortion cannot occur if liability is less
than actual damages up to the efficient output (and greater than actual—24—
damages beyond the efficient output)..2i Suppose, for example, that the
factory's liability is $5,000 for the first unit of output, $6,000 for the
second unit, and $7,000 for each subsequent unit. If the first unit is
produced, the factory gains $12,000 (=$17,000—$5,000)and the resident
loses $2,000 ($7,000—$5,000).Since the resident would only be willing
to pay up to $2,000 to prevent the factory from producing the first unit,
there is no way the resident could bribe the factory to not produce the
first unit. The same analysis applies to the second and all subsequent
units. Thus, the factory will again maximize its after—liability profits by
producing at the efficient output.
When a damage remedy is used, the distribution of income is completely
determinate and independent of the relative bargaining strengths of the
parties if liability is less than or equal to actual damages up to the effi-
cient output (and greater than or equal to actual damages beyond the efficient
output). This was illustrated in the two preceding examples in which, respec-
tively, liability was equal to and less than actual damages. In both cases
the victim suffered his actual damages less liability payments and the factory
obtained its full profits less liability payments. There was no scope for
bargaining in either case. Note that in both cases the factory obtained all
of the gains from trade. By choosing the entitlement point and the particular
schedule of liability——less than or equal to actual damages——between the
entitlement point and the efficient output, it is possible to achieve a wide
range of distributional outcomes under the damage remedy. However, for
reasons discussed in the next section, not all possible income distributions
can be achieved in this way. But since it is still assumed that costless
redistribution Is possible, this limitation of the damage remedy does not
matter at this point. If the desired distribution of income cannot be achieved—25—
directly by the damage remedy, lump—sum transfers can be used to achieve it.
Thus, despite strategic behavior, if the liability schedule is chosen appro-
priately, the damage remedy can be used to reach the efficient and the
distributionally equitable result.
Thus, despite the presence of strategic behavior, either an injunctive
remedy or a damage remedy can be used to reach the social welfare maximum,
provided redistribution is costless and the court has perfect information.
Strategic behavior can be overcome under the injunctive remedy by the appro-
priate choice of the entitlement point——coinciding with the efficient output.
And strategic behavior can be overcome under the damage remedy by the appro-
priate choice of the liability schedule——for example, coinciding with the
victim's actual damage schedule. Given perfect information, these choices
are feasible, and in each case they lead to the efficient outcome. The
availibility of costless redistribution again assures that distributional
equity will not be sacrificed by the pursuit of efficiency.—26—
VI. COSTLY REDISTRIBUTION
The assumption thus far that income could be costlessly redistributed
by lump—sum transfers has been a convenient fiction. In general, income
redistribution is costly in the sense that the methods of redistribution
inevitably create "distortions" in individuals' behavior.J] For example, the
major distorting effect of an income tax is to lower the effective price of
leisure (which is the after—tax wage rate) relative to purchasable commodities,
thereby causing persons to work less hard, everything else equal. To emphasize
the implications of costly redistribution, it will now be assumed that redis-
tribution by means other than through the design of injunctive and damage
remedies is impossible. The assumption of strategic behavior will be maintained
from the previous section and it will still be assumed for now that the
courts have perfect information..?!
In the present setting injunctive remedies are no longer able in general
to simultaneously achieve the efficient and the distributionally equitable
solution. In order to reach the efficient result, it was seen in the previous
section that itisnecessary because of strategic behavior to choose the
efficientoutput as the entitlement point. It was also seen that this choice
implied a particular distribution of income. Only by coincidence would this
distribution be the equitable one. Now, since lump—sum transfers are not
available,the only way to change the distribution of income isby changing
theentitlement point. But if the entitlement point does not coincide with
the efficient solution, then efficiency will not be achieved because of
strategic behavior. Thus, in the present setting, there is a fundamental
conflict between efficiency and distributional equity under the injunctive
remedy.—27—
It will be useful to consider how wellthe injunctive remedy can do when
social welfare depends primarily on
distributional equity rather than efficiency,
and when the distributional goal stronglyfavors the resident—victim relative
to the factory—injurer. Under the injunctiveremedy, the best off the resident
can be made is to have an absoluteentitlement assigned to him. He is thereby
guaranteed not to have to suffer any damages.Moreover, the resident will
obtain some share of the gains from tradeif the parties can agree on how to
share these gains. Since the parties areassumed to bargain strategically,
suppose they are able toreach an agreement only with respect to thefirst two
units of output, stopping short of the
efficient output of three units. The
gains from trade in moving from zerooutput to two units is $16,000. Thus,
the resident will end up with some amountbetween $1 and $15,999 (assuming
dollars are not divisible), depending onthe relative bargaining strengths
of the parties.
It was seen in the previous sectionthat in order for the damage remedy
to avoid the problems created by strategicbehavior, it is necessary that
liability be less than or equal toactual damages up to the efficient output
(and greater than or equal to actual damagesbeyond the efficient output). It
will now be shown in the following examplethat there is no advantage in terms
of efficiency or distributional equity to
setting liability less than actual
damages.
Suppose there is an absoluteentitlement to the resident and that the
factory's liability is $2,500 for thefirst unit of output, $4,500 for the
second unit, and $7,000 for each subsequentunit. Thus, liability is less
than actual damages for the first twounits. Since the resident cannot bribe
the factory to reduce output, the factorywill produce at the output which
maximizes its after—liability profits——an output
of three units. The resident—28—
suffers a marginal loss (after receiving the liability payment) of $4,500 from
the first unit ($7,000—$2,500),$2,500 from the second unit, and nothing
from all subsequent units. Thus, at the efficient output the resident suffers
total losses of $7,000 ($4,500+ $2,500). Similarly, the factory's marginal
profits (after making the liability payments) are $14,500 from the first unit
(=$17,000—$2,500),$8,500 from the second unit, and $2,000 from the third
unit. Thus, the factory's total after—liability profits are $25,000. Now
suppose that the entitlement is changed from an absolute entitlement to the
resident to an entitlement corresponding to one unit of output and, at the
same time, liability (beyond the entitlement point) is set equal to actual
damages. Again, the factory will end up producing at the efficient output of
three units. Since the resident's marginal damages are now $7,000 for the
first unit and zero for all subsequent units, the resident's total damages are
$7,000, the same as before. And since the factory's marginal profits are now
$17,000 for the first unit (since there is no liability), $6,000 for the second
unit (=$13,000—$7,000),and $2,000 for the third unit, the factory's total
profits are $25,000, the same as before. Thus, both with respect to efficiency
and distributional equity, the outcome is unaffected.
This example illustrates something which Is true in general: any distribu-
tional outcome achievable by choosing some entitlement point with liability
less than actual damages can be duplicated by starting from a different entitle-
ment point with liability equal to actual damages.! Put another way, there is
no advantage with respect to distributional equity to setting liability less
than actual damages.
The discussion thus far suggests that the schedule of liability under the
damage remedy should coincide with the schedule of actual damages. Liability
schedules which overcompensate are subject to strategic behavior problems.—29—
Liability schedules which undercompensate provide no advantages. Assuming
that liability equals actual damages, the damage remedy will be efficient
regardless of the entitlement point since the factory will maximize its after—
liability profits at the efficient output. Although there may be an argument,
discussed below, for setting liability in excess of actual damages despite the
strategic behavior problems, it will be assumed for now that liability is set
equal to actual damages.
Since setting liability equal to actual damages leads to theefficient
output regardless of the entitlement point, the choice of the entitlement
point can be based solely on distributional considerations. Each entitlement
corresponds to a particular distribution of income. For example, setting the
entitlement at two units of output implies that the factory's profits will be
$32,000 (=$17,000+ $13,000 + $2,000) and the resident's losses will be $14,000
(a loss of $7,000 from each of the first two units of output). If this is the
desired distributional outcome, then it can be reached under the damage remedy
(without sacrificing efficiency).
Suppose, however, that the distributional goal strongly favors theresident
relative to the factory. The best off the resident can be made is to be given
an absolute entitlement. Assuming liability equals actual damages,this implies
that the resident will suffer no damages and the factory will make total profits
of $18,000 ($10,000+ $6,000 + $2,000). Note that all of the gains from
trade resulting from the move from zero output to the efficient output of
three units——which amounts to $l8,000——go to the factory.
The preceding discussion indicates a possible advantage of the Injunctive
remedy over the damage remedy In the present setting. Although the damage
remedy with liability equal to actual damages can achieve the efficient outcome,
it will In general be distributionally inferior to the Injunctive remedy—30—
when the distributional goal strongly favors the resident—victim relative to
the factory—injurer. Under the damage remedy with an absolute entitlement to
the resident, the resident suffers no damages but all of the gains from trade
go to the factory. Under the injunctive remedy with the same entitlement, it
was seen above that the resident is guaranteed not to have to suffer any damages,
but also in general obtains some fraction of the gains from trade even though
the parties do not reach the efficient output because of strategic behavior.
Thus, the resident is always at least as well off, and in general is better
off, under the injunctive remedy. If social welfare depends primarily on
distributional equity rather than efficiency and if the distributional goal
strongly favors the resident—victim relative to the factory—injurer, then the
injunctive remedy would be socially preferable to the damage remedy. However,
if efficiency is sufficiently important or If the distributional goal does not
strongly favor one party, then the damage remedy would be socially preferable.
One final possibility needs to be considered. Thus far, it has been
assumed that under the damage remedy liability was set equal to actual damages
to avoid the problems of strategic behavior. It was shown that the injuricLive
remedy might be preferable to this version of the damage remedy on distributional
grounds. When distributional equity is the basis for prefering the Injunctive
remedy, it makes sense to consider the damage remedy with liability greater
than actual damages. Although this version of the damage remedy is, like the
injunctive remedy, generally inefficient, the question is whether the distribu-
tional effects of the damage remedy might now be preferable to those of the
injunctive remedy.
It was seen in the previous section that If the resident is overcompensated
under the damage remedy, the difference between the liability payment and the
resident's actual damages Is subject to negotiation because the factory can—31—
deny this gain to the resident by not producingthat unit of output. At best,
the resident is able to retain all of the excess compensation,and at worst,
the resident foregoes all of the excess compensation, leavingthe resident
just fully compensated for actual damages.Under the injunctive remedy, at
best, the resident can obtain all of the gainsfrom trade, and at worst, the
resident is fully compensated for actual damages. If theresident is the
superior bargainer and comes close to his best outcome,then the resident
would be better off under the injunctive remedy unless the liabilityschedule
under the damage remedy coincides with the factory's marginal profitschedule.
If liability equals the factory's profits——a type of restitutionremedy——then
all of the gains from trade are subject to negotiation underthe damage remedy,
so the resident could still obtain all ofthe gains from trade if he is the
much superior bargainer.L'
It may appear, therefore, that the injunctive remedy and the damageremedy
with liability equal to the factory's profits are equivalent since theyboth
lead the parties to bargain over all of the gains from trade. However,there
is one potentially important remaining difference. Under the injunctiveremedy,
the resident—victim plays the role of the "hold out" and threatensthe other
party. Under the damage remedy with overcompensation,the factory—injurer
adoptsthis role. Thus, depending on which party is thought to be more stubborn,
it may be preferableto use one remedy or the other.
Thus,when the parties bargain strategically and redistributionis costly,
neitherremedy is always preferable. However, ifthedistributional goal does
notfavor one party too strongly, then the damage remedy is superior to the
injunctive remedy and can maximize social welfare. In this case,liability
canbe set equal to the victim's actual damages, thereby reaching the efficient
output, and the entitlement point can be chosen to achievethe distributional—32—
goal. If the distributional goal is strongly weighted toward one party, then
the Injunctive remedy may be preferable. For example, if the victim's welfare
matters most, an absolute entitlement to the victim protected by an injunctive
remedy allows the victim to share in the gains from trade, unlike a damage
remedy with liability equal to actual damages. Although setting liability In
excess of actual damages also allows (at least some of) the gains from trade
to be bargained over, the Injunctive remedy may still be preferable if the
injurer is thought to be the more stubborn "hold out."—33—
VII. IMPERFECTINFORMATION, I:
ASSYMETRICALINFORMATION
The assumption thus far that courts have perfect information may be a
useful approximation in some circumstances but is probably not very realistic
in general. It will now be assumed that the courts have imperfect information
of the following sort. They know the resident—victim's schedule of damages
but do not know anything about the factory—injurer's schedule of profits. For
example, it is quite plausible that a court may have relatively good information
about the damages from pollution but not know much about the cost to the polluter
of abating pollution.! (Alternatively, it might be assumed that the court
knows the factory's profit schedule but not the resident's damageschedule..!
This case is not discussed since it is analogous to the present one.) The
assumptions of strategic behavior and costly redistribution will be maintained
from the earlier sections.
In the present setting the injunctive remedy cannot achieve the efficient
outcome. The reason is simple. To reach the efficient outcome under the
injunctive remedy, it is necessary, because of strategic behavior, tochoose
the entitlement point to coincide with the efficient output. But to determine
the efficient output the court must know when the marginal profits of the
factory from further production just fall below the marginal damages tothe
resident. Knowledge of the damage schedule alone is obviously not sufficient
to determine this level of output. Although the court could "guess"what the
efficient output is, if the court makes a mistake,which it will in general,
the parties will not end up bargaining back to the efficient output because of
strategic behavior.
It will be useful to consider again how well the injunctive remedy can do
when social welfare depends primarily on distributional equity rather than—34—
efficiency, and when the distributional goal strongly favors the resident—victim
relative to the factory—injurer. As it turns out, the discussion of this
issue in the previous section applies here as well. It is still best to assign
an absolute entitlement to the resident. And the resident will in general
still obtain some of the gains from trade——how much depends on the relative
bargaining strengths of the parties and on the extent to which they stop short
of the efficient output because of strategic behavior.
In the present setting the damage remedy can reach the effiient outcome
despite the court's imperfect information. This can be guaranteed, however,
only by assigning an absolute entitlement to the resident—victim and setting
liability equal to actual damages——a type of strict liability solution. Any
otherentitlement point might lead to the efficient outcome but cannot be
guaranteed to. For example, suppose an entitlement point corresponding to
fourunits of output is chosen. Since liability for producing the fifth unit
is $7,000 (the resident's damages) and the marginal profits of the factory are
only $1,000, the factory will choose to remain at an output of four units. At
this output, the resident will have an incentive to "bribe" the factory to
reduce output to three units, but because of strategic behavior, the parties
in general will not reach that output. On the other hand, if the court chooses
an entitlement point corresponding to one, two, or three units of output and
sets liability equal to actual damages, the damage remedy will lead the factory
to produce at the efficient output. Assuming liability is set equal to actual
damages, this shows that the damage remedy leads to the efficient outcome only
if the entitlement point is "below" the efficient output. However, since the
court cannot determine the efficient output from its limited information, the
only way to guarantee the efficient result is to choose the lowest possible
entitlement point——an absolute entitlement to the resident.—35—
Obviously, if the liability schedule does not coincide withthe damage
schedule, there is no reason to believe that the efficient outputwill be
reached regardless of which entitlement point is chosen. For the reasons
discussed in the preceding two sections, to avoid strategic behavior problems,
liability must be less than or equal to actual damages up to the efficient
output (and greater than or equal to actual damagesthereafter). Since the
court does not have enough information to determine the efficient output, the
only liability schedule which will definitely satisfy this requirementis one
coinciding with the actual damage schedule.
issuming that liability equals actual damages, the distributional goal
can be promoted by choosing an appropriate entitlement point. However, as
seenabove, if the entitlement point chosen is "beyond" the efficient output——
which the court cannot know——then the outcome will be inefficient because of
strategic behavior. Thus, there is a tradeoff between efficiencyand
distributionalequity.
Suppose the distributional goal strongly favors the residentrelative to
the factory. The corresponding discussion of injunctive and damage remedies
in the previous section applies to the present setting essentiallywithout
change. Under the damage remedy, if the resident is given anabsolute entitle-
ment with liability equal to actual damages, the residentwill not suffer any
damages but all of the gains from trade will go to the factory.Under the
injunctive remedy, at least some of the gains from trade,and possibly most of
the gains, go to the resident. Thus, if social welfare depends primarily on
distributional equity and if the resident is strongly favored relative tothe
factory, then the injunctive remedy would be socially preferableto the damage
remedy. However, if it is believed that the factory—injurerrather than the—36—
resident—victim is the less stubborn bargainer, then it may make sense to use
the damage remedy with liability in excess of actual damages in order to reverse
the role of who has the right to "hold out."
Thus, the comparison between injunctive and damage remedies is quite
similar to the discussion in the previous section. On balance, however, if
the court has assymetrical information, the damage remedy becomes less attrac-
tive relative to the injunctive remedy. When the court had perfect information,
the damage remedy could both reach the efficient output and achieve the distribu—
tionally equitable result if the distributional goal does not strongly favor
one party. Now, however, there is frequently a tradeoff between efficiency
and distributional equity under the damage remedy even when one party is not
strongly favored. Any entitlement choice other than an absolute one to the
resident may lead to an inefficient outcome.—37—
VIII. IMPERFECT INFORMATION, II:
UNDERSTATED DAMAGES
Theassumption in the previous section that the courtknows the victim's
damages (but not the injurer's profits) may beunrealistic in many contexts.
It will now be assumed that the court systematicallyunderestimates the victim's
damages. This would seem to be a plausible assumptionbecause in practice the
victim's compensation for damages is limited to "objective" damages,excluding
any "subjective" (or "idiosyncratic")element. Since the damage's actually
suffered by the victim include the subjective component, the damageaward will
not fully compensate thevictim...7i Thus, it will now be assumed in the numerical
example that the court sets liability at $4,000 perunit of output even though
the victim's actual damages are $7,000. The assumptionsof strategic behavior
and costly redistribution will be maintained from theearlier sections.
The discussion of the injunctive remedy in the previoussection applies
to the present setting as well. The court cannotachieve the efficient outcome
because it does not have enough information to determine theefficient output.
And when social welfare depends primarily on the victim's welfare, anabsolute
entitlement to the victim guarantees not only that the victimwill not suffer
any damages but also that he willobtain some share of the gains from trade.
In the present setting, the damage remedy can no longer in generalreach
the efficient outcome. Consider, for example, what happenswhen the court
uses an absolute entitlement to the resident—victim.It was seen in the previous
section that, given this entitlement point, the damage remedyleads to the
efficient output when liability is set equal to actual damages. Now,however,
if liability is set equal to the court's estimate of damages,the damage remedy
will lead the factory—injurer initially to "overshoot" theefficient output—38—
since liability is too low. In the numerical example, the factory would produce
four units of output since marginal profits exceed the marginal liability
payments of $4,000 up to and including the fourth unit. Thus, the factory
will produce one unit too many. This is not In general the final outcome for
the reasons now discussed.
Since the initial production decision of the factory is an Inefficient
one, there are potential gains from trade. Starting at an output of four
units, the resident would gain $3,000 if output were reduced byone unit; his
actual damages would fall by $7,000 but he would lose a liability payment of
$4,000. The factory would lose only $1,000 by this change; its profits would
fall by $5,000 but it would not have to make a liability payment of $4,000 to
the resident. Thus, there is an incentive for the resident to pay the factory
some amount between $1,000 and $3,000 for the factory to reduce output by
one unit. Assuming strategic behavior, such a deal will in general not occur.
There is another reason why the parties may not remain at the output of
four units initially chosen by the factory. Suppose the factory increased its
output to five units. The resident would suffer additional damages of $7,000
and would receive only $4,000 In liability payments, so he would be worse off
by $3,000. The factory would make additional profits of $1,000 but would have
to make a $4,000 liability payment, so It would also be worse off by $3,000.
Thus, the factory is in a position to threaten to increase output to five
units unless the resident pays some amount up to $3,000. If the factory believes
it is the better bargainer, such a threat might be made. But if the resident
believes he is the better bargainer, he might refuse to pay what the factory
demands. As a result, the factory may carry out the threat in order to establish
credibility in the next round of negotiations. If the threat is carried out,
so the factory increases output to five units, the same kind of situation—39—
arises at five units. At worst, this process could lead the factory to produce
seven units.
It will now be useful to compare the injunctive and damage remedies when
an absolute entitlement is assigned to the victim for distributional reasons
and, in both cases, strategic behavior leads to the worst possible outcome.
Under the injunctive remedy, the worst outcome is for the parties to remain
at the entitlement point. At this outcome, the factory earns no profits and
the resident suffers no damages, whereas at the efficient output, of three
units, total profits exceed total damages by $18,000. Thus, there is $18,000
which the parties could split between themselves if they could agree on how to
share it. This amount will be referred to as the "efficiency loss."
Under the damage remedy, the worst outcome is for the parties to end up
at an output of seven units as a result of the factory having carried out its
threats..' At this output, the factory's total profits are $35,000 and
its total liability payments are $28,000 ($4,000 per unit of output), so its
after—liability profits are $7,000. The resident's total damages are $49,000
but he receives $28,000 in liability payments, so his damages after compensation
are $21,000. Thus, between the parties, there is a net loss of $14,000
($21,000—$7,000)..2iAt the efficient output of three units there is a
net gain of $18,000. Thus, relative to the efficient outcome the parties are
worse off by $32,000 ($14,000+ $18,000). This is the efficiency loss under
the damage remedy.
In terms of efficiency, the preceding discussion shows that when the
parties bargain strategically and the court underestimates the resident—victim's
damages, the injunctive remedy may be preferable to the damage remedy. In the
example, the efficiency loss under the damage remedy was $32,000, whereas it
was only $18,000 under the injunctive remedy. In general, either remedycould—40—
be the more efficient one, depending on the degree of strategic behavior and
on the extent to which the court underestimates damages.
The Injunctive remedy may also be preferable to the damage remedy in
terms of distributional equity. Suppose the distributional goal strongly
favors the resident—victim enough so that he is given an absolute entitlement
(regardless of which remedy is used). The preceding discussion showed that
when the worst outcome occurs because of strategic behavior, the resident
suffered no damages under the injunctive remedy and uncompensated damages of
$21,000 under the damage remedy. Similarly, the factory obtained no profits
under the injunctive remedy and after—liability profits of $7,000 under the
damage remedy. Thus, the resident—victim is much better off and the factory—
injurer is only somewhat worse off under the Injunctive remedy. Since it is
assumed that the distributional goal strongly favors the resident, it is
likely that the injunctive remedy would be preferred. In general, either
remedy could be the more equitable one, depending on the specific outcomes
under the two remedies and on the relative distributional preferences regarding
the two parties.
Thus, when the parties bargain strategically, when income redistribution
is costly, and when courts underestimate the victim's damages, neither remedy
is generally preferable. This is true regardless of whether the distributional
goal strongly favors one party (recall that when the court was assumed to have
perfect information, the damage remedy was preferred if the distributional
goal did not favor one party too strongly). Once the courts base liability on
an underestimate of the victim's damages, the damage remedy is subject to
the same kind of strategic behavior problem as the injunctive remedy. This
accounts for why, depending on the extent to which the parties bargain
strategically and the extent to which the court understates damages, either
remedycould be more desirable In terms of efficiency and distributional equity.—41—
IX. MANY VICTIMS
In a nuisance dispute in which there is more than one victim, it is often
not practical to have the class of victims represented by a single party.
(The same statement applies to injurers, but for simplicity it will continue
to be assumed that there is only one injurer.) For concreteness, now suppose
there are 1,000 resident—victims, each suffering $7 in damages for each unit
of the factory's output. Thus, the data in Table 1 still apply, but in the
case of the residents, refer to their aggregate damages. In these circumstances,
social welfare will be assumed to depend on the victims' aggregate damages.
Much, but not all, of the previous comparison of injunctive and damage remedies
carries over to the present setting.
In the best of all possible worlds——cooperative behavior, costless redis-
tribution, and perfect information——injunctive and damage remedies are equally
desirable for the reasons discussed earlier. (However, the assumption of
cooperative behavior is especially unrealistic when there are many victims
because of the cost of their getting together to negotiate with the factory.)
The efficient outcome can be reached by setting the entitlement point equal to
the efficient output under the injunctive remedy and by setting liability
equal to actual damages under the damage remedy. The equitable distribution
of income can be achieved in both cases by lump—sum transfers.
Also as before, the presence of strategic behavior does not change matters
by itself, although strategic behavior now operates in a different way because
of the large number of victims involved. Under the injunctive remedy, if the
entitlement point corresponds to an output less than the efficient output of
three units, each of the 1,000 victims has the power to block the factory's
desired increase in output. In order to obtain as much of the gains from
trade as possible, each resident would attempt to be the "hold out"——the final—42—
resident whose consent has to be obtained. The likely outcome is that the
aggregate demands of the residents will exceed the maximum willingness to pay
of the factory, so the parties will remain at the initial entitlement. If the
entitlement point exceeds the efficient output, then the factory must be paid
to reduce output. But then each resident will attempt to take a "free ride"
on the others' contribution. As a result, the parties will remain at the
entitlement point. Efficiency can still be achieved, however, by choosing an
entitlement point which coincides with the efficient outcome. Aid distributional
equity can be achieved by lump—sum transfers. Under the damage remedy, the
efficient result can be reached if the entitlement point corresponds to an
output below the efficient output and liability is equal to actual damages.
Each resident is then compensated for his actual damages and there is no scope
for strategic behavior. The distributionally equitable outcome can be achieved
through lump—sum transfers.
Unlike in the case of one injurer and one victim, if costly redistribution
is also a problem, the damage remedy is superior to the injunctive remedy.
(Recall that in the case of one injurer and one victim the injunctive remedy
could be superior if social welfare depended to a sufficient extent on one
party's welfare.) Under the injunctive remedy, the parties remain at the
entitlement point either because of "hold out" or "free rider" behavior.
Thus, choosing the entitlement point generally Involves a tradeoff between
efficiency and distributional equity. Whatever entitlement point is chosen, a
better result can be achieved under the damage remedy. For example, suppose
social welfare depends primarily on distributional equity and the distributional
goal strongly favors the resident—victims. Under the injunctive remedy, an
absolute entitlement to the residents guarantees that they will not suffer any
uncompensated damages, but the hold out problem prevents them or the factory—43—
from obtaining any of the gains from trade. Under the damage remedy with the
same entitlement point and liability equal to actual damages, the residents
are no better or no worse off, but the factory is induced to produce at the
efficient output and is better off by the gains from trade. Thus, social
welfare is improved..i It may even be possible now to share the gains from
trade under the damage remedy by overcompensating the resident—victims without
running into the "extortion" problem discussed earlier (see Section
In any event, the damage remedy is preferable to the injunctive remedy in
these circumstances.
The same argument in favor of the damage remedy applies when the court
alsohas imperfect information of the asymmetrical sort——complete knowledge
of the resident—victims' damage schedules but no knowledge of the factory—
injurer'sprofit (or, equivalently, cost of abatement) schedule. Under the
injunctive remedy, the parties remain at the entitlement point, whereas tinder
the damage remedy the factory may beinduced to produce at the efficient output
atno sacrifice of the welfare of the residents.
Finally, if the court has imperfect information which leads it to under-
state the victims' damages, then, as in the case of one injurer and one victim,
there is no clear preference for injunctive or damage remedies. The reason
for this conclusion is similar to the earlier discussion and can be illustrated
by a simple example. Suppose, on distributional grounds, an entitlement is
chosen corresponding to two units of output. Under the injunctive remedy,
this will be the final outcome because of "hold out" behavior. The efficiency
loss is $2,000 (the gains from trade from two units to the efficient output of
three units). Under the damage remedy, the outcome depends on the court—imposed
schedule of liability. Suppose the court's estimate of damages is $4 per unit
of output for each of the 1,000 residents. Given liability of $4,000 per—44—
unit of output starting with the third unit, the factory will maximize its
profits by producing at four units (see Table 1), overshooting the efficient
output by one unit. Because of free rider behavior, the residents will not
bribe the factory to reduce output. Similarly, any extortion threat by the
factory to increase output will be met by inaction; each resident will let the
others pay. Thus, unlike the case of one injurer and one victim, the initial
profitmaximizing output of the factory will be the final output. At this
output (four units), there is an efficiency loss of $2,000, the same as for
the injunctive remedy in this example. But the distributional outcome may be
worse under the damageremedy since the resident—victims are worse off than
theywould be if they were at the entitlement point (because they are under—
compensatedfor the third and fourth units of production). Moreover, if the
residents'damages were understated by an even greater degree, the efficiency
loss under the damage remedy would exceed that of the injunctive remedy.
Thus, if there are many victims, the same basic conclusion applies under
the most realistic set of assumptions: neither remedy is generally prefer-
able when the parties bargain strategically, when income redistribution is
costly, and when the courts underestimate the victims' damages.
It should be pointed out, however, that the analysis of injunctive and
damage remedies when there are many victims may be of limited relevance for
two reasons. First, there are numerous ways in which the interests of the
parties can be aggregated. A class action is the most common way. Once
this occurs, the analysis of the case of one injurer and one victim is more
relevant.! Second, if the victims' interests cannot be aggregated, publicly
enforced remedies are probably preferable to either of the privately enforced
remediesdiscussed here.±.i Regulations or fines are two common examples. For
these reasons, the emphasis in this essay has been on the case of one injurer
andone victim.—45—
X. CONCLUSION
It will now be useful to reconsider the three traditional arguments for
damage remedies over injunctive remedies discussed in the introduction. This
will be done only within the case of one injurer and one victim. The assumptions
which seem most realistic——strategic behavior, costly redistribution and
understated damages——will be emphasized.
The first argument against injunctive remedies was that they allowed tle
plaintiff to "extort" the defendant, that is, to obtain compensaiion (possibly
far) in excess of the plaintiff's actual damages.! It is now clear that
"excess" compensation simply means that the plaintiff is sharing the gains
from trade with the defendant. Within the present framework, neither party is
"entitled" to these gains in the first place. Thus, as has been seen, the
desirabilityof these extortion benefits depends on the distributional goal
which isbeingpromoted. If the distributional goal strongly favors the plain-
tiff andredistribution by other means is costly, then the excess compensation
maybe desirable.
Tothe extent that this argument against injunctive remedies is valid
because the extortion subverts the distributional goal, the argument may also
apply equally forcefully to damage remedies. If the court has imperfect infor-
mation and understates the plaintiff—victim's damages, then the defendant—injurer
isput in a position to "extort" the plaintiff in two ways. Since the defendant's
outputwill initially exceed the efficient output when damages are understated,
the plaintiff will have an incentive to bribe the defendant to reduce output.
But the defendant can hold out for more than his lost profits, thereby extorting
the plaintiff (in the same sense as under the injunctive remedy). Moreover,
the defendant can threaten to increase output beyond his profit maximizing
output, extorting the plaintiff in this way. Thus, the extortion argument—46—
against the injunctive remedy may be misguided even on Its own terms if,
realistically, the court underestimates the plaintiff's damages.
The second argument for damage remedies concerned the efficiency conse-
quences of unsuccessful extortion. According to this argument, strategic
behavior under the injunctive remedy might lead to the enforcement of the
injunction when it was not efficient to enforce it. Given strategic behavior,
this criticism Is valid whenever the entitlement point does not coincide with
the efficient outcome. However, the same type of criticism applies at least
as forcefully to the damage remedy when, realistically, courts are assumed to
underestimate the plaintiff's damages. As noted in the previous paragraph,
when damages are understated, the defendant is put in a position to extort the
plaintiff In two ways. Strategic behavior might lead to the defendant's rejec-
tion of the "bribe" from the plaintiff to reduce output. Or strategic behavior
may lead the defendant to carry out threats to increase output. Either way,
the efficiency loss from strategic behavior under the damage remedy could be
larger than the efficiency loss under the injunctive remedy.
The third argument favoring damage remedies was based on the apparent
distributional flexibility and fine tuning inherent in the liability schedule——
the schedule can allow for any amount of overcompensation ("bonus payments")
or undercompertsation. In contrast, it was noted, the distributional outcome
under the injunctive remedy is indeterminate because of strategic behavior.
However, the potential distributional superiority of damage remedies requires
that the courts have perfect information about the plaintiff's damage schedule.
Even then, it has been shown that there is never an advantage to using a liability
schedule which undercompensates the victim. Moreover, it has been shown that
liability schedules which overcompensate the victim are subject to the same
kinds of strategic behavior problems which arise under the injunctive remedy,—47—
thereby destroying the fine tuning advantage. And when, more realistically,
courts understate damages, the distributional advantages of the damage remedy
may disappear altogether.
The preceding discussion should not be interpreted as stating a case for
the use of injunctive remedies. Rather, the goal here has been to examine
systematically whether the conventional arguments favoring damage remedies are
logically coherent. They are not. Under no set of consistent assumptions is
there an unambiguous case for damage remedies (except, possibly, when there
are many victims). And under the most realistic set of assumptions——strategic
behavior, costly redistribution, and understated damages——the argument could
easily go either way.i
Despite the indeterminacy of the optimal remedy in theory, what the
best remedy is in practice may turn out to be clear. For example, if it seems
that the parties would act very strategically and that the court has relatively
good information about damages, then a strong case for a damage remedy can be
made. On the other hand, if the parties are likely to bargain cooperatively
and the court has bad information about damages, an injunctive remedy may be
preferred. The arguments developed in this essay may be helpful in clarifying
the goals in resolving nuisance disputes and, given the goals, the principles
relevant to choosing the best remedy.—48—
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Many of the ideas in this article were developed primarily for an
economics audience in more technical form in Polinsky, Controlling
Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property Right, Liability Rule,
and Tax—Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. Legal Studies 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Controlling Externalities] and Polinsky, On the Choice Between Property
Rules and Liability Pules, 18 Econ. Inquiry ———(1980)[hereinafter cited as
On the Choice]. The present article, besides being non—technical and oriented
primarily towards a legal audience, organizes the material quite differently.
It is also assumed that the injurer and the victim are not in any
kind of contractual relationship.
The traditional common law doctrines of intentional private nuisance
and intentional trespass probably come closest to representing what I mean
by a nuisance dispute (although I do not necessarily mean to limit nuisance
disputes to cases which fall within these doctrines). See, e.g., Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 157—164 (intentional trespass), 821D, 825 (intentional
private nuisance) (1965).
See notes 42—43 infra and accompanying text.—49—
Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).
The following comments are indicative:
Nuisance law would function better if, in general, a plaintiff
in a nuisance case were limited to choosing between the remedies of
rule two (damages) and rule four...[reverse damages].
Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681, 738 (1973).
Heavier reliance by courts upon...[damage remedies] would...
benefit not only...the immediate parties to nuisance actions, but
also society at large.
Rabin, Nuisance Law: Rethinking Fundamental Assumptions, 63 Virginia L.
Rev. 1299, 1300 (1977).
The Comment concludes that the ideals of flexibility and efficient
cost allocation embodied in Boomer [a classic damage remedy case]
should be followed in all nuisance cases.
Comment, Internalizing Externalities: Nuisance Law and Economic Efficiency
53New York Univ. L. Rev. 219, 220 (1978).
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 4, present arguments for both injunctive
and damage remedies. Their discussion, id. at 1118—19, 1127, seems to imply
that injunctions are more efficient when there is only one victim and one
injurer. Itshouldbe pointed out,however,that this argument has been
disputed——correctlyin my opinion——by Ellickson, supra, at 743—47; see
note8 infra.Calabresi and Melamed are more explicit, id. at 1106—10,
1119—21, that damage remedies tend to be more efficient when there are many
victims. More recently, Calabresi has come out more strongly in favor of
damageremedies:—50—
[The damage remedy is] a device for promoting clearly collective
goals..., while still permitting a wide degree of atomistic choice and
determination...[T]he next century will be the century not of contracts
nor of criminal law.. .but of torts and of the [use of damage remedies].
Calabresi, Torts——The Law of the Mixed Society, in American Law: The Third
Century 103, 112—13 (B. Schwartz ed. 1976) (footnote omitted).
R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (2d ed. 1977), argues that damag€
remedies should be used when "transaction costs" are high and Vhat injunctive
remedies should be used when such costs are low. Id. at 51. He notes that
transaction costs are highest when there is one injurer and many victims,
but that transaction costs "may be quite high" even when there is just one
injurer and one victim (because of strategic behavior). Id at 45.
Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non—Accidental Perspective on
Calabresi's Costs, 80 Yale L. J. 647, 669—73 (1971), concludes that when
there is one injurer and many victims, damage remedies should probably be
used unless the efficient outcome is for the injurer's activity to be
enjoined (that Is, when the injurer is the "cheapest cost avoider"). Id. at
672. He does not consider the case of one injurer and one victim.
There are some recent commentators who seem to prefer (or are at least
much more sympathetic towards) the injunctive remedy. See, e.g., Note, In-
junction Negotiations: An Economic, Moral, and Legal Analysis, 27 Stanford
L. Rev. 1563, 1567—68, 1569 n.24 (1975) (arguing that injunctions are more
efficient than damages when the measure of damages understates the plaintiff's
true damages and the efficient outcome is for the defendant's activity to he
enjoined) [hereinafter cited as Note, Injunction Negotiations], and 0. Fiss,
The Civil Rights Injuction 74-80 (1978). See also Comment, Equity and the
Eco—System: Can Injunctions Clear the Air?, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1254 (1970).—51—
Since historically both injunctive and damage remedies have been
available in nuisance cases, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821D (Comment
a) (1965), it is not possible to generalize accurately about trendswithout
an empirical investigation of the decisions over many years. However,most
commentators believe that damage remedies are being used increasingly by
American courts. The following "capsule history" of judicial practices in
nuisance cases is representative of this view:
At common law, courts traditionally granted injunctiye relief
(rather than damages) upon a showing that the defendant interferred
unreasonably with the plaintiff's enjoyment of his or her own land...
Courts gradually became aware that the costs to society of enforcing
injunctions might exceed the true costs of the harms they remedied;
but rather than shift to a damage remedy, courts responded by refusing
to find nuisances at all when the harm resulted from activitiesthat
were socially beneficial. More recently, however, courts have begun
to recognize the appropriateness of damage remedies...
Note, Efficient Land Use and the Internalization of Beneficial Spillovers:
An Economic and Legal Analysis, 31 Stanford L. Rev. 457, 464—65 (1979)
(footnotes omitted).
See also Rabin, supra note 5, at 1300 n,4 (referring to "...the trend
toward awarding damages rather than an injunction in nuisance cases..."),
and Note, Injunction Negotations, supra note 5, at 1566 n.13 (mentioning
"[tjhe preference of today's court system for damages over injunctive
relief...").
The leading modern American cases illustrating the use of damage
remedies are Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870,
309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970), and Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108—52—
Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972). The precedential value of the Boomer
decision is in some doubt as a result of Copart Industries, Inc. v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 41 N.Y.2d 564, 362 N.E.2d 968, 394 N.Y.S2d 169
(1977).
In England, there is apparently a stronger preference for injunctions
relative to damages. See Ogus & Richardson, Economics and the Environment:
A Study of Private Nuisance, 36 Cambridge L. J. 284, 309 (referring to "th
clear English judicial preference for [injunctions] over [damages]").
Recently, however, there may have been "[s]ome easing in the judicial
attitude" with regard to this preference. Id. at 310, citing Miller v.
Jackson and Another, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 20.
ii These three arguments have not to my knowledge been stated in any
one place, although each has been made explicitly. See note 8 infra.
The preference by recent legal commentators for damage remedies,
supra note 5, is based primarily on the strategic behavior argument and
secondarily on the bonus payment argument. For examples of the former
argument, see Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 4, at 1106—07, 1119 (discussing
"holdout" and "freeloader" problems when there is one injurer and many
victims), and Ellickson, supra note 5, at 742—47 (dfscussing the same
problems when there is one or many victims). Although Calabresi and Melamed
seem to believe that strategic behavior problems only arise when there are
many victims (or many injurers), Ellickson has pointed out that strategic
behavior problems can also arise when there is only one injurer and one
victim. This point has also been emphasized, for example, by Regan, The
Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J. Law & Econ. 427, 428—32 (1972), and
by Cooter, The Cost of Believing Coase's Theorem, Working Paper No. 76,
Dept. of Econ., Univ. of Calif. at Berkeley, Nov. 1976. See also R. Posner,
supra note 5, at 45. For an example of the bonus payment argument, see—53—
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 4, at 1110, 1121. The term"bonuspayment"
is due to Ellickson, supra note 5, at 735—37, although he uses the term
somewhat differently than here. As Ellickson uses it, a bonus payment is
to be added to an "objective" market value measure of damages in order to
more closely approximate the actual "subjective" damages suffered by the
plaintiff. In his view, these payments "could be defined through 1egisled
schedules, perhaps as specific percentages of the market value award," i&
at 736. Thus, if one wanted to pursue a distributional goal through the
damage award, one could use a smaller or larger percentage.
Some earlier legal commentators who preferred the damage remedy based
their case primarily on the extortion argument. See, e.g., Keeton & Morris,
Notes on "Balancing the Equities," 18 Texas L. Rev. 412 (1940).
The increasing judicial preference for damage remedies, to the extent
that there is a trend, supra note 6, seems to be based on the extortion and
strategic behavior arguments. The former argument is embodied in the
equitable hardship doctrine, which states that if there is scope for
substantial extortion under the injunctive remedy, it should not be used
(even if alternative remedies result in too little compensation). See
Note, Injunction Negotiations, supra note 5, at 1577 ("Virtually every
United States legal jurisdiction has turned to the equitable hardship
doctrine as a cure for the "extortion" problem, and its use is still
growing;" footnote omitted). The strategic behavior argument is illustrated,
for example, in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d
870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). The court explicitly assumed that if an
injunction were granted to the plaintiffs, they would not settle the case
despite the fact that their damages were $185,000 and the defendant's
investment in his plant was $45,000,000. Id. at 225, 257, N.E.2d at 873, 309—54—
N.Y.S.2d at 316—17. The strategic behavior argument is also implicit in
the defense to an injunction that the plaintiff acted in bad faith or for
the purpose of a "vexatious lawsuit." See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law
of Torts 611 (4th ed. 1971), citing Edwards v. Allovez Mining Co., 38 Mich.
46 (1879) and Abdella v. Smith, 34 Wis. 2d 393, 149 N.W.2d 537 (1967).
2!Theseare the same goals adopted by Calabresi & Melamed, supra note
4, at 1093—1101. Although they also discuss "other justice reasons," id.
at 1102—05, they "admit that it is hard to know what content can be poured
into that term, at least given the very broad definitions of economic
efficiency and distributional goals that we have used," Id. at 1102. For
an interesting discussion of nuisance law based on principles of "corrective
justice" ("rendering to each person whatever redress is required because of
the violation of his rights by others"), see Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective
Justice. and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. Legal Studies 49, 50 (1979).
See also Ogus & Richardson, supra note 6, at 317—23, and see generally R.
Stewart & J. Krier, Environmental Law and Policy: Readings, Materials and
Notes 168—97 (2d ed. 1978).
12!See,e.g., R. Musgrave & P. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and
Practice 691—94 (1973).
IL'See,e.g., Note, An Economic Analysis of Land Use Conflicts, 21
Stanford L. Rev. 293 (1969), and Starrett & Zeckhauser, Treating External
Diseconomies——Markets or Taxes?, In Statistical and Mathematical Aspects of
Pollution Problems 65, 72—82 (J. Pratt ed. 1974),.
1]Inorder to justify this assumption, it is necessary to assume that
the parties have special reasons for wanting to be at their present locations
(for example, due to specialized production advantages or locational—55—
amenities) and that they therefore are willing to pay the most to be there
regardless of how the nuisance dispute is resolved. Otherwise, it would be
necessary to consider the possibility of "entry" of other parties or of
"exit" of the existing parties, thereby greatly complicating the discussion.
For analyses of injunctions and damages when the efficient solution involves
entry or exit, see Frech, The Extended Coase Theorem and Long Run Equilibrium:
The Nonequivalence of Liability Rules and Property Rights, 17 Econ. Inquii
254 (1979) (entry and exit of both injurers and victims when t1ie parties do
not bargain with each other), and Polinsky, Controlling Externalities,
supra note 1 (exit of the victim when the parties do bargain with each other).
In many realistic situations of this sort, there are other non—
represented "parties" such as nearby communities dependent on the factory's
employment. See, e.g., Nichelman, supra note 5, at 681—83, and R. Stewart
& J. Krier, supra note 9, at 230, 245. The issues raised by the existence
of such parties are not discussed in this essay.
For expositional reasons, I will refer to this output as the
efficient one even though this may not be strictly correct. See note 18
in fra.
This, of course, assumes that the factory has no fixed costs and
that there are no fixed damages.
See text at notes 17—18 infra.
171 See note 14 supra.
11 For expositional simplicity, I will treat the distributional issues
as distinct from the efficiency issues even though this is strictly correct
only if income can be costlessly redistributed between the parties. See,
e.g., Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A
Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87 Rarv. L. Rev. 1655,
1665—69, 1676—80 (1974)—56—
2iSee,e.g., Section VI infra.
See note 31 infra and accompanying text.
Under circumstances different from the ones assumed here, it may
not be desirable to sacrifice efficiency to promote distributional goals
through the choice of a legal rule. See Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs.
Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Equity Matter Given Optimal Income
Taxation?, unpublished manuscript, Dept. of Econ., Harvard Univ., Aug.
1979. But see Kronman, Distributive Justice, Libertarianism and the Law
ofContracts, unpublished manuscript, Yale Law School, Sept. 1979.
See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 4, and Ellickson, supra
note 5, at 738—48.
Spur. Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Arlz. 178, 494 P.2d
700 (1972).
What I am referring to is called "rule four' by Calabresi & Melamed,
supra note 4, at 1116, a "compensated injunction" by Ellickson, supra note
5, at 738 n.202, and a "conditional injunction" by Rabin, supra note 5,
at 1300. Despite Ellickson's and Rabin's inclusion of the word "injunction"
in their terminology, their definition of the remedy clearly makes it a
form of damage remedy.
This seems to be the position of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(1965). The "reasonableness" standard in intentional private nuisances
limits the circumstances in which liability for harm is imposed. Id. at
§826, Comment b. R. Stewart & J. Krier, supra note 9, suggest that the
reasonableness standard might be interpreted as (in my terminology) defining
an entitlement corresponding to the efficient output. Id. at 225—26. For
an example of an Intermediate entitlement in practice, see Smith v. Staso
Milling Co., 18 F.2d 736 (2d CIr. 1927) (allowing a limited amount of
dust from defendant's slate crushing mill).—57—
See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 4, Ellickson, supra
note 5, at 738—48, and Rabin, supra note 5.
There is also a fourth possibility that has not been referred to in
the text——a damage remedy working in both directions. To my knowledge,
this remedy has not been considered by courts or legal commentators. Since
it turns out in most of the situations considered in this essay not to be
helpful, I will ignore it.
This setting essentially corresponds to that assumed by the "Coase
Theorem" with zero transaction costs. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960). See also Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource
Allocation and Liability Rules——A Comment, 11 J. Law & Econ. 67 (1968).
Litigation may be explained by other factors besides strategic
behavior, such as different expectations about winning the case.
?21 To make the points I want to make, it is only necessary to assume
that they fail to reach an agreement at the earliest possible opportunity.
The delay due to strategic behavior is a permanent loss even if the parties
eventually resolve the dispute efficiently.
If liability were less than actual damages beyond the efficient
output, the factory would have an incentive to threaten to produce beyond
its after—liability profit maximizing output (which in turn would be beyond
the efficient output)
JI See, e.g., the discussion in Polinsky, supra note 18, at 1676—78,
and the references cited.
Since, with perfect information, the court could base transfers on
criteria over which the parties have no control, it may seem peculiar to
assume that the court cannot use lump—sum transfers. The assumptions made—58—
in this section are useful pedagogically because they allow the effects of
costly redistribution to be understood most simply. Moreover, as an
institutional matter, courts are not allowed to engage explicitly in
general redistribution.
This is demonstrated formally in Polinsky, On the Choice,supra
note 1, at
2!!Thesame would be true if liability were to exceed the factory's
profits.
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 4, at 1119—21.
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 4, at 1120—21, and I. Stewart
& J. Krier, supra note 9, at 252.
21/See,e.g., R. Stewart & J. Krier, supra note 9, at 201, 243, 283.
See also 1 J. Bonbright, The Valuation of Property 14—16, 40—97, 269—97
(1937). It is, of course, possible that a court's estimate of the "objective"
damages could be too high, leading to overcompensation.
If, as assumed, the factory cannot produce more than seven units,
then It would probably not carry out Its last threat to produce the seventh
unit since it loses by doing this and gains nothing In credibilityregarding
threats to produce additional units. However, imagine that thefactory
could produce eight or more units, but that the parties endup with seven
being produced.
This net loss can also be determined by subtracting the factory's
pre—liablilty profits of $35,000 from the resident's pre—compensatlon
damages of $49,000. The liability payments do not affect the net loss
since what one party gains the other loses.
The validity of this statement presumes an "individualistic" social
welfare function, that is, one in which social welfare increases Ifany one—59—
individual's welfare improves and no one else is made worse off. This kind
of social welfare function is frequently assumed by economists.
This argument is developed in Polinsky, On the Choice, supra note
1, at ———.
Thecase of one injurer and one victim may also be relevant if th
interests of the victims are aggregated through a public official, as in a
parens patrlae proceeding. The official, rather than a private representative,
is then In a bargaining situation with the injurer (or injurers' representative).
The terms of an out—of—court settlement would correspond to the private
bargaining outcome discussed in this essay.
See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 5, at 761—79; Michelman, supra note
5, at 666—80, and R. Stewart & J. Krier, supra note 9, at 255—324. But
see Comment, Equity and the Eco—System: Can Injunctions Clear The Air?,
supra note 5, at 1259—62.
When the victims' interests cannot he aggregated, the analysis of one
victim and one injurer may still be relevant to some extent. For example,
even when actions are brought by public officials for public nuisances,
private individuals who suffer harms of a different kind may bring private
actions. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821C (1965).
Iftheentitlement Istothe right of the efficient output,It is
thedefendant who does the extorting. He may obtain compensation (possibly
far) inexcessof his actual reduction Inprofits.
Regardlessof whether there is one or many vIctims, this general
conclusionwould be true even If efficiency were the only goal. See Sections
Vill—IX supra.